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SO: This is Dr Sue Onslow talking to Mr Rashleigh Jackson in Demerara, 
Guyana, on Tuesday, 27th January, 2015. Sir, thank you very much 
indeed for agreeing to take part in this oral history of the 
Commonwealth project. I wonder if you could begin by commenting, 
please, on what you thought of the Commonwealth as an idea and as an 
association at the beginning of the 1960s, when you joined the new 
Ministry of External Affairs for the government of British Guiana. 
 
RJ: Well, in 1960, we were still a colony and therefore the Commonwealth was, 
for us, still the British Commonwealth. It was a collection of countries having a 
relationship with Britain, in one form or another, most of them being ex-
colonies. But at a different level, the philosophical level, one saw it not as an 
institution but as a collectivity that represented certain commonalities: 
commonality of language, commonality of political system and commonality of 
certain basic values. There were some practical things in the sense that, in 
Guiana’s case, the currencies were tied [and] markets were available through 
the Commonwealth Preference System. So, it had both a practical and a 
philosophical element. 
 
SO: Guyana became independent in May 1966. The Commonwealth itself 
changed with the creation of the Commonwealth Secretariat in 1965, the 
previous year, and the creation of the new post of Secretary General. At 
what point would you say that you started to alter this view of a ‘British’ 
Commonwealth? 
 
RJ: Well, I think that as we approached independence, we began to think about it. 
The fact that India became a republic and remained in the Commonwealth 
was of great significance. In fact, you find that in the first foreign policy debate 
in our legislative assembly in 1967, Prime Minister Forbes Burnham had 
made reference to that particular point – that the Commonwealth was no 
longer a ‘British’ Commonwealth. Therefore, for people who had been British 
University  of  London 
INSTITUTE OF COMMONWEALTH STUDIES 
2 
 
– who had been colonies of Britain and, in Guyana’s case, part of its political 
evolution, involving quite contentious relations with Britain – the fact that it 
was no longer the ‘British’ Commonwealth was significant. 
 
SO: By 1968 you had become Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of 
External Affairs and that department, of course, evolved into the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs by 1972. Was that particular office still very 
firmly within the Office of the Prime Minister in 1968? In other words, 
was it the Office of the Prime Minister that directed, shaped and framed 
Guyanese foreign policy? 
 
RJ: Well, the Department of External Affairs started before independence under 
Dr Cheddi Jagan. It was a Department, with foreign affairs associated with 
[but] not assigned to the government. In 1964, when Burnham became 
Premier, he appointed a minister without portfolio, Deroop Maraj, and then we 
went into separate quarters. So, there was a physical separation from out of 
the Office of the Prime Minister into our own Department of External Affairs, 
with a ‘minister with portfolio’ not having the responsibility for foreign affairs 
but reporting to Burnham. Then, in 1966, the Department was still there, but 
foreign affairs was now the responsibility of the Prime Minister. Then, when 
Sonny Ramphal came, he was made Minister of State. Then Ramphal was 
Attorney General and Minister of State. Later, in 1972, he became Minister of 
Foreign Affairs and, I think, Minister of Legal Affairs as well. 
 
SO: Yes. During that evolution of the structure of Guyana’s foreign policy 
making, what was Prime Minister Forbes Burnham’s attitude to the 
value of the Commonwealth in terms of day-to-day diplomacy? Do you 
recall? 
 
RJ: I think that he had respect for and a great interest in continuing the 
relationship with the Commonwealth, because there was a motion in 
Parliament for us to remain a member of the Commonwealth.   
 
SO: Do you mean when Guyana became a Co-operative Republic in 1970? 
 
RJ: No, when we became independent: we had to take a formal decision to 
remain in the Commonwealth. And in fact this leads to a very interesting 
point. Because of the nature of domestic politics at the time, we had the 
opposition of Dr Jagan. He abstained on the motion that we should remain in 
the Commonwealth. He had a personal view. First of all, Dr Jagan, in 1966-
1967, was more left-wing than Burnham. He had harboured the feeling that 
he had been put out of office by the British and in his mind he was 
gerrymandered out of office in 1964.   
 
SO: Well, he was, Sir! Britain changed the constitution and brought in 
proportional representation precisely to achieve that goal! 
 
RJ: Well, I have a view of that which doesn’t accord with the popular view. Shall I 
tell you? 
 
SO: Please do. 
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RJ: After Burnham lost in the 1961 elections, he raised [a question] in his party 
circles after looking at the seats and votes he’d obtained. This showed that if 
you had proportional representation, the representation of his party would 
have been much greater and the representation of Jagan’s party would have 
been less. So, the party took a decision then, at the Congress of 1962, to 
advocate proportional representation as a means for reforming the electoral 
system. And in fact, they organised their own constituent assembly. Later on, 
he got the support of the United Force party for proportional representation 
and proposed to Jagan that there should be a referendum in Guyana about 
proportional representation. Jagan refused. So, what I’m saying is that there’s 
a tendency – and I have a personal view and feeling about this – to portray 
Burnham as being willing to work along with the Western powers in order to 
defeat Jagan. [He was] not really a stooge, or a …  
 
SO: No, but there was a degree of collaboration? 
 
RJ: Yes. In my experience with Burnham, I found that he had such a great sense 
of his own capacity that he believed that he could always achieve his 
objectives: “This is what I want, and if you can help me to get it, then I’ll go 
along with you!” Which was very different from Jagan. Jagan was loyal to the 
Soviet Union. In fact, in 1991 at his Party Congress he said, “We have been 
wrong to have followed Soviet foreign policy, even when we disagreed with 
it.” That was a very significant statement to make. I am trying to underline the 
difference between the two. 
 
 So, when they went to London for the constitutional conference, Jagan was 
the first person to sign the letter asking Duncan Sandys to decide on the 
system, because he was of the view that since the British were not 
themselves wedded to proportional representation – in relation to their 
country – so they wouldn’t apply it to Guyana. 
 
SO: [Laughter] Okay. So, as a political calculation, that proved something of 
a miscalculation? 
 
RJ: In fact he was criticised by his own party for agreeing and for signing the 
letter. 
 
SO: So, what you’ve underlined here is Prime Minister Forbes Burnham’s 
self-belief, his surety of purpose and his ability to manoeuvre, to use the 
political space? 
 
RJ: Yes, or marry the interests of his country with the interests of Burnham, not to 
the detriment of the interests of Guyana. 
 
SO: Sir, at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, did you 
witness Prime Minister Forbes Burnham using the Commonwealth 
precisely because it helped to provide this space in the international 
system, to further Guyana’s foreign policy? 
 
RJ: I can’t say that. My mind is really hazy about attitudes to the Commonwealth 
in the period leading up to independence. I think he was more driven by the 
materialistic side. He would see the Commonwealth being useful in terms of 
being a market for sugar – we had a preferential system arrangement. And I 
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suppose, to some extent, on the philosophical side, our values. He himself 
had trained as a lawyer in Britain, and it’s the place in which he got some of 
his political groundings. 
 
SO: I believe he studied at the University of London. You went to the 
University of Leicester, did you not? 
 
RJ: Yes. England was where he got a lot of his political groundings. It was a 
venue for people who were advocating an end to colonial rule. A number of 
people with whom he became very close later on were also students at the 
time: like Errol Barrow and Seretse Khama. So, the Commonwealth provided 
that opportunity, that facility, whereby political development could take place. 
 
SO: And also you started to establish those interpersonal relationships 
which proved of such value in international diplomacy 
 
In the early 1970s, it would appear to me – as a historian looking at 
President Burnham’s decision to go for the Co-operative Republic and 
the shift to the left in terms of his domestic politics – that there was a 
greater emphasis in foreign policy on the Non-Aligned Movement. 
 
RJ: Well, I want to say something about that. I think that you have to look at 
Burnham in the pre-independence period to see what he had said in general 
terms. What was his vision for Guyana? Because I believe foreign policy has 
domestic determinants, and you’d find that he had this great sense of 
independence – I can find you a number of quotes on this. He had this great 
feeling about two things: one is that you can always learn. In relation to 
foreign policy – he was clear about this, too – that [because] we’re a new 
nation, and although we have ideas that we bring of where we want to go, 
we’re entering into an arena in which we have to learn. And the second thing 
is that we are learning as independent people. I say this because he saw 
decolonisation as not just the end of a colonial relationship. He called it ‘a 
decolonisation of attitudes’, and what I call ‘the decolonisation of the mind’ – 
so that unless your mind is decolonised, you can’t really pursue 
independence. 
 
SO: Yes, I understand totally what you mean. 
 
RJ: You understand? 
 
SO: Yes, I do. 
 
RJ: So, in this respect, when he was going to deal with the Commonwealth and 
the Non-Aligned Movement, [they are] going to see Guyana as an 
independent country pursuing its own interests. But recognising that other 
people have interests, therefore you can’t always pursue your interests, 
ignoring other people’s interests. Now, where [does] that take you in relation 
to CARICOM and the Non-Aligned Movement? As regards CARICOM, and as 
regards the Caribbean, I think that was a bedrock belief of his that we are in 
this neighbourhood. We have a lot of commonalities which took place even 
before independence. In fact – I said the same in a speech when I spoke in 
Brazil – if you look at the pre-independence period, there was so much 
contact between the Caribbean countries, through what are called ‘hucksters’ 
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in the Southern Caribbean and ‘higglers’ in Jamaica; [and] among 
professional groups, like teachers. My own father, who was a headmaster, 
was President of the Caribbean Union of Teachers. You had it among the 
trade unions, led by the Caribbean Labour Congress. So, the point that I’m 
making is that within the Caribbean, before independence, you had a welter 
of connections and therefore for Burnham, Caribbean unity was almost 
second to Guyana’s independence. 
 
SO: So, this then was an integral part of his attitude to the region: the value 
of regionalism, in addition to being a proud nationalist? 
 
RJ: Yes, yes. And non-alignment. I’m going to use this phrase here: he had a 
phrase, “With countries of another language, we have a community of 
aspirations” – having most of us being ex- colonies, French, Dutch, whatever 
it is. It’s a “community of aspirations.” So, you have the Caribbean which is 
like this shaped circle, and then they had the Non-Aligned Movement. 
 
SO: As you say, that larger entity. Like the G77, it’s a bigger pond. 
 
RJ: Yes. In that context, then, the relationships were in concentric circles. I don’t 
know how to put it, but do you understand? 
 
SO: Yes, I do. It’s like a series of interlocking circles which have utility in 
certain places, for certain norms. They’re not mutually exclusive in any 
way, but enable a degree of hybridity. 
 
RJ: Yes. 
 
SO: On the Non-Aligned Movement in the 1970s, I am aware of the decision 
to hold a Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers conference and that you hosted 
the first such conference here in Georgetown in 1972, which also saw 
the establishment of a Secretariat. It was then that the candidacy of 
Sonny Ramphal as the next Secretary General of the Commonwealth 
started to gather momentum. 
 
RJ: He deals with that very fully in his book. [Shridath Ramphal, Glimpses of a 
Global Life (Hertford: Hansib Publications, 2014)] 
 
SO: Yes, he does! I just wondered if you’d like to comment from your 
standpoint, because by that point you were Guyana’s representative at 
the UN. 
 
RJ: I was also a small part of this lobbying group. At the UN, I was at that time 
President of the UN Council for Namibia, and there was a meeting in 
Mogadishu, Somalia, where the OAU was meeting. So, I was going to be 
there in my capacity as President of the UN Council for Namibia. The decision 
was taken that John Carter – who was then our High Commissioner in 
London, and who Sonny says played a principal part in this – should also be 
in Mogadishu in order to promote the candidacy. It was an interesting time! I’d 
arrived there first. Now, hotel accommodation was difficult to find because of 
all these African countries attending, but I was there first and, coming from 
the UN, I got preference. When John came, he couldn’t negotiate hotel space! 
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SO: [Laughter] That would be very frustrating!  
 
RJ: What I was able to do was to get the hotel to move a second bed into my 
room. So, we were able – in close proximity! – to discuss how we would go 
about promoting Sonny’s candidacy. I mean, it’s an interesting situation. 
 
SO: You make it sound a little like a cell for conspirators! [Laughter] 
 
RJ: To go back to the main point, later on, I think, all the Guyanese missions were 
involved in at least ascertaining the view of countries on Sonny’s candidacy. 
So, John and I were able to sound out people. It was a great thing for 
Guyana. 
 
SO: Oh, yes. It was a very big thing for the next Secretary General of the 
Commonwealth to be from Guyana. 
 
RJ: I was also in New York when he was trying for the Secretary Generalship. He 
mentions it in the book. In 1971…I don’t know if he mentions 1971 in the 
book? 
 
SO: No, but he did certainly covers his bid for the UN in the 1980s.  
 
So, was the Commonwealth of any particular use in Guyana’s dealings 
with Venezuela, over Venezuela’s claim to the Essequibo? 
 
RJ: Oh, yes. In terms of the claim by Venezuela, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
was the first line of defence. We had to use diplomacy in order to advance our 
case and – if I may say so – I think we did a damn good job! So, we had 
CARICOM first, and after CARICOM, the Non-Alignment Movement. We 
chose areas where Venezuela was not in force. Then, the first time we raised 
it with the Commonwealth that I can remember was at the Melbourne 
Conference. 
 
SO: Yes, the 1981 Melbourne CHOGM. 
 
RJ: Actually, it was a late decision. The Australians sent their envoy around the 
Commonwealth to help them to plan the meeting. At that time, we had not 
worked out a strategy and told them we hadn’t. But now they had made us 
think about it. So, we had internal discussions and when we got to Melbourne, 
we got to see people. Forbes Burnham saw Mrs Gandhi. I did my own work 
and then we began to work with officials, with foreign ministers, and that’s 
how we got the statement on the communiqué. 
 
 So, the Commonwealth has always been one of the collectivities on our radar. 
It was always seen as a collectivity that would give us support in dealing with 
Venezuela. And then, don’t forget Britain itself was a signatory to the Geneva 
agreement.  
 
SO: Yes, of 1966. [The ‘Agreement to resolve the controversy over the 
frontier between Venezuela and British Guiana. Signed at Geneva, 17 
February 1966’] 
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RJ: Yes. So, they should be our immediate ally, even though the enthusiasm may 
be muted because they have interests too. So, the Commonwealth has been 
very helpful and useful in our dealings. How should I put it? I don’t want to say 
in our “fight”, but in pursuing settlement of the controversy we have with 
Venezuela. 
 
SO: Venezuela’s claim poses an existential challenge to Guyana, given the 
size of the claim to the Essequibo. 
 
RJ: Oh, yes. And from what I can gather now, we are suffering from their 
economic hostility. Anyway, that’s another issue. 
 
SO: But it’s a long-burning issue, dating back to the late 19th century? 
 
RJ: 1899. They had an arbitration treaty in 1897. It’s a very curious history. It just 
shows that, as I say, the only thing that’s constant in international relations is 
change. Because when Venezuela was making a lot of noises against 
Britain’s colonial presence, they went to the United States for help. The 
United States had already pressured Britain into signing the Treaty of 
Arbitration in 1897. The judges named by Venezuela were American judges, 
and they had America counsel. And now look at Venezuela and the United 
States! 
 
SO: Well, indeed! So, was the Commonwealth – as a supportive association 
expressing solidarity with Guyanese national interest – equally useful in 
your relations with Suriname? 
 
RJ: Not to the same extent, but useful nonetheless. Certainly, as I understand it, 
we got a lot of help from the British in terms of documents – access to their 
archives and so on. 
 
SO: In the context of the dispute over the New River Triangle? 
 
RJ: No, in the context of demarcation of the maritime boundary. As regards 
Venezuela, I don’t know if you’d call it a Commonwealth connection or a 
British connection, but we’ve also had eminent British lawyers – Sir Francis 
Vallat and, later on, Sir Ian Brownlie, who was on the ICJ – [who] were 
engaged by us to give us opinions. 
 
SO: So, you didn’t seek legal opinion via the Commonwealth Secretariat? 
 
RJ: No, no. 
 
SO: In fact, you went for British judicial opinion? 
 
RJ: Yes. 
 
SO: I know that the Legal Division of the Commonwealth Secretariat in the 
1970s and also in the 1980s was enormously useful in providing 
constitutional legal advice on maritime boundaries. They also provided 
legal expertise for President Seretse Khama in Botswana’s negotiations 
over mineral royalties with Anglo American. 
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RJ: I don’t know. 
 
SO: I just wondered if there was a comparable supportive arrangement. 
 
Sir, when Sonny Ramphal was elected Secretary General at the 
Kingston Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting, you were 
President of the UN Council for Namibia and Guyana also had the non-
permanent seat on the UN Security Council.   
 
RJ: That’s right. 
 
SO: This seems to be a real point of Guyana ‘riding high’ in terms of its 
diplomatic exposure and standing.  
 
RJ: It was not by accident! [Laughter] 
 
SO: I’m sure it was not by accident! 
 
RJ: It’s very interesting. In 1979, I think it was, when Cuba was running for the 
non-permanent seat on the Security Council, we were not a candidate, but we 
were getting more votes than Cuba! [Laughter] 
 
SO: People felt that Guyana should be the Latin American and Caribbean 
representative? [Laughter] 
 
RJ: A lot of those were against Cuba. We had to formally notify the General 
Assembly that we were not a candidate. 
 
SO: Oh, really? “We do not have our hat in the ring!” [Laughter] 
 
RJ: We had decided that we would put our hat in the ring in 1981, I think. It was 
when the Protocol of Port of Spain was due to end. 
 
SO: Yes, because you were elected to the UN Security Council in 1982/83.   
 
RJ: What I’m saying is [that] our prime concern was [that] Venezuela [should] not 
get a seat on the Security Council again. [Laughter]. 
 
SO: There was clearly a ‘Stop Cuba’ aspect to those manoeuvrings!  
 
 What of the view of the Commonwealth from the UN? 
 
RJ: First of all, the way the UN is structured is they have regional groups, like 
Latin America, Asia, Western Europe – what they call ‘WEOG’, the Western 
European and Other Group – and Eastern Europe. You have the Arab group. 
There’s no common group that cuts across developed and developing 
countries and regions, except in the Arab group, in the Middle East. Later on, 
you got the OIC – the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. Now, in that 
context, the Commonwealth in my recollection only played a role on an ad 
hoc basis around issues. For instance, they used the UN as a meeting place 
for carrying out Commonwealth assignments. Sonny had a Commonwealth 
Committee on Southern Africa, and they would meet as deemed appropriate 
during the session when all the ministers were out there. They would then 
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arrange for such a meeting. When the Commonwealth had a committee on 
Belize, the Chairman was Minister Henry Forde of Barbados and they would 
meet. Within my recollection – and this is after I became Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, and this was during Anyaoku’s time – in the preparation for the 
UNCED conference in 1992. When the Commonwealth was very concerned 
about the issues of small states, a group of Commonwealth small states 
countries was organised for the UNCED and they asked me to chair the 
meetings.   
 
SO: Was that particularly because of the report you wrote in 1982 whilst at 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs? [Safeguarding the Security of Small 
States (Information Division, Guyana, 1982)] I just wondered whether 
your chairmanship of this group came out of your long involvement in 
security of small states issues. 
 
RJ: No, that came out of Grenada. The Commonwealth then was given a 
mandate to advance the interests of Commonwealth small states. In addition 
to environment and development, the concept was growing, but it had not yet 
gelled. It was something that had been launched by the Caribbean countries 
– particularly by Barbados. There was a group of small island developing 
countries within the smaller states. So, I think Anyaoku felt the 
Commonwealth had a mandate in the context of UNCED to bring the small 
states of the Commonwealth together. They could promote their common 
interests at UNCED. I can’t remember a Commonwealth meeting of the Latin 
American group, of the Arab group of the Non-Aligned group meets. 
 
SO: So, it didn’t have a permanent standing presence; it was more of an ad 
hoc arrangement convened on specific issues for collective action? 
 
RJ: Yes. On issues that the Commonwealth had decided [would] need common 
action, like the Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern 
Africa convened at Vancouver. I sat on that committee. 
 
SO: You did, indeed, with Joe Clark as your chairman. 
 
RJ: Yes. He was very kind to me, after I resigned as Minister. 
 
SO: Joe Clark gave me an excellent interview for this project.  
 
 Please, Sir, if I could just ask you to go back a little bit in the 
chronology. Do you recall identifying the emergence of this ad hoc 
Commonwealth committee arrangement at the UN in the 1970s? Or was 
this a later phenomenon of the 1980s, do you think? 
 
RJ: 1970s, around that area. I remember there was a Canadian foreign minister 
named Don Jamieson.  
 
SO: Once Sonny Ramphal became Commonwealth Secretary General in 
1975, he developed even more of an international profile. Did you 
maintain particular contacts with him? 
 
RJ: Oh, yes. We were always in contact. He was an activist and an 
interventionist! He was a committed internationalist, and he had very strong 
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and deep beliefs about what the international community should do. To my 
mind, he saw the Commonwealth as playing a role in bringing order into the 
international system and community. To my mind, that explains his work in 
such a wide field – in humanitarian law, development and security issues… 
He had a phenomenal personal commitment. 
 
SO: Indeed. As well as energy, drive and charisma. Did you feel – or did you 
observe – any complicating factor in his determined internationalism in 
that he had worked so closely with President Forbes Burnham, who 
became something of a controversial figure in international relations as 
the 1970s progressed? I wondered if that affected how Sir Sonny was 
perceived by other international leaders and diplomats. 
 
RJ: It’s difficult for me to answer. I think I could venture an answer in terms of the 
domestic situation, which meant that the forces [that] were opposed to Forbes 
Burnham attached some of their hostility to Ramphal.  
 
SO: Yes, I can understand the domestic environment spill-over effect. But I 
wondered if there was any sense of Ramphal’s former close political 
links with Burnham being a complicating factor for him in international 
relations? 
 
RJ: Let me be honest: I can’t see it. I can’t see.  
  
SO: Sir, you became Foreign Minister of Guyana in 1978. You came back 
from New York and took over the political portfolio rather than the civil 
service portfolio. 
 
RJ: Unexpectedly. Some of my closest colleagues in Guyana had inveigled 
against what I then considered my interests! They went to Burnham and I 
think they told him that they were not comfortable with my predecessor, and 
[that] they would recommend me. I’d already served five years in New York. 
After I had served three, I had told the President that I thought three years 
was a good term. I said, “If you want me back home after this, this is alright 
and you will find me not hostile to it. But I would like to do it for one more year 
because my last two years have been taken up with Security Council work. 
So, I really have not been able to attend as much as I would like to in some 
other UN work which, again, is in Guyana’s interests.” He said, “Okay.” But 
then that was in 1977. When I came back in 1978, I said, “Well, I’m back.” 
And then he dropped this bombshell on me. [Laughter] 
 
SO: How long did you take to decide? 
 
RJ: A couple of days. My family were still in New York. I had come down for the 
Heads of Mission conference. The irony was [that] my predecessor had left to 
go to Brussels for a meeting with the EEC, and he said, “Look, I want you to 
stay. I want to talk to you when I come back; there are some things I want to 
say.” I said, “Okay,” so I delayed my departure, and then Burnham called me! 
 
SO: When you became Foreign Minister, how far was Guyana’s policy 
against the white minority states of Rhodesia and South Africa a key 
foreign policy strategy? I am aware that in 1979 you attended the Non-
Aligned Movement meeting in Havana which helped persuade the 
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Zimbabwean liberation leaders Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe that 
they should attend the London conference following the Lusaka 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting.  Do you have any 
recollections of that particular meeting in Havana? 
  
RJ: I remember [that]. at the Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers meeting in Maputo, 
January-February 1979, I had a long discussion with Robert Mugabe. It was 
the first time that we were really getting into Mugabe’s head. I think they had 
already got into Nkomo’s head by previous contacts, and my own report was 
about Mugabe – in terms of his fighting and so on. He was very forthright. I’m 
trying to think of the sequence. I have no recollection of the meeting in 
Havana. But I know that we were always working for unity among the 
liberation movements. We kept on good terms on both sides. My 
predecessor, Frederick Wills, also had relations with James Chikerema. So, I 
think that the contacts we had were with Nkomo and Chikerema, and after 
that, Mugabe.  
 
SO: But you were promoting the unity of the Patriotic Front? 
 
RJ: Yes. 
 
SO: Sir, the reason I asked this question is because, as you know, in his 
book, Sir Sonny places great emphasis on the role of the 
Commonwealth in promoting Zimbabwe’s final transition to 
independence. 
 
RJ: Obviously. Correct, yes. 
 
SO: I’m just trying to add a little more background detail. Sir Sonny 
obviously emphasises the importance of the Commonwealth Heads of 
Government meeting in Lusaka, and yet it was by no means certain that 
the heads of the Zimbabwean liberation movements would agree to the 
all-party discussions in London. I know that the NAM meeting at Havana 
was very important in terms of persuading Nkomo and Mugabe to attend 
the Lancaster House talks. 
 
RJ: Well, Burnham was always backing Sonny, but telling him how he felt. So, I 
wasn’t privy to all these discussions. I would only know the results: that, 
“Okay, things are going to move ahead.” 
 
SO: So, the other big issues for the Commonwealth – from Guyana’s 
perspective – were Namibia and Grenada. 
 
RJ: I think the Commonwealth played a large role – I should say, the 
Commonwealth at the UN. The Commonwealth always provided the chairman 
of the Council for Namibia, the Committee against Apartheid, and the 
Committee of 24. I remember in the Kingston meeting in 1975, the section on 
Southern Africa was drafted by Salim Salim, Paul Lusaka and myself as three 
heads of the three committees of the UN. Salim was chair of the Committee 
of 24 [and] Lusaka was chair of the Committee against Apartheid, I believe. I 
was chair of the UN Council on Namibia. What I’m saying is that 
Commonwealth offered the roles and provided the personnel for committees 
on these critical issues. Nigeria held the post of Chairman of the UN Special 
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Committee Against Apartheid for a long time. First, you had Edwin Ogebe 
Ogbu [1972-75] and then you had Leslie Harriman [1976-79]. [And later, B 
Akporode Clark, 1979-81; Alhaji Yusuff Maitama-Sule, 1981-83; JN Garba, 
1984-90; and Ibrahim A Gambari, 1990-94]  
 
SO: You are making the point that there was a network of key 
Commonwealth diplomats in leading committee positions at the UNO. 
 
RJ: Yes. 
 
SO: Was the Commonwealth then an important facilitator on the Namibia 
issue? 
 
RJ: Oh, yes. Well, after they had the agreement, the Commonwealth became 
helpful with things like the constitution. 
 
SO: I am aware that the Commonwealth had provided training for Namibians 
in exile as well solidarity with Sam Nujoma and SWAPO. There was also 
diplomatic engagement from individual countries.  
 
RJ: Yes, from Commonwealth countries: ourselves, Jamaica... Theo-Ben Gurirab 
travelled on a Guyanese diplomatic passport. One year, Rupiah Banda and I 
brought a delegation of the Council for Namibia to Guyana… I think that’s in 
the book. And Burnham had proposed that the UN should pay for the SWAPO 
office. So, the Commonwealth has been helpful to these countries.   
 
SO: Guyana’s support for the anti-apartheid movement also included 
providing a staging post for Cuban troops going into Angola, as part of 
Havana’s push to drive back South Africa and Pretoria’s own support 
for UNITA in Angola. Was that controversial in the Commonwealth 
context? 
 
RJ: Not as far as I know. The Americans didn’t like it. Henry Kissinger told my 
predecessor, “You are giving the Soviet Union outreach into Africa.” 
 
SO: Really? 
 
RJ: Yes. [Laughter] 
 
SO: I’m sure I can imagine what your Foreign Minister said to that!   
 
RJ: Kissinger said, “Now that I’ve dealt with Moynihan, how do I deal with you?”  
[Laughter] In the dulcet tones of his German English, [he said], “I understand 
that you have a formidable intellect.” 
 
SO: I don’t think Kissinger would have been too happy by the response he 
got from your foreign minister then! 
 
Sir, please could I ask you about Grenada and the Commonwealth? 
You’ve written about this at length in your memoirs. I’m not asking you 
to recapitulate this, but I would like to know your views about the 
Commonwealth dimension of that crisis from 1979 up to 1983. 
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RJ: Sonny’s book is very good on this. Do you mean the Commonwealth as a 
collectivity, as an association? 
 
SO: Yes, I do. 
 
RJ: Well, the New Zealand Prime Minister Robert Muldoon was very fed up with 
the discussion in New Delhi about Grenada – as Lee Kuan Yew was about 
refugees in Africa, until Nyerere shut him up and told him how many refugees 
he was dealing with, and what was the population of Singapore! [Laughter] 
 
SO: This was the time of the Vietnamese ‘boat people’… 
 
RJ: Yes, and I remember Thatcher said, “And they’re leaving in awfully leaky 
boats!”   
 
 On the Commonwealth and Grenada, I know [that] Maurice Bishop was in 
Lusaka in 1979. I remember because I led the Guyana delegation to Lusaka. 
Douglas… I cannot be sure of his name. [He] led the Dominican delegation 
and St Lucia was led by their Foreign Minister, and we all were in Lusaka 
together. I held a lunch with them and we used to meet as the Caribbean 
‘non-heads’ in Lusaka. But now and again, Maurice would come and join us 
because Barbados and Jamaica were not very friendly to Maurice. Barbados 
was unfriendly. Manley was friendly, but there had been a difference between 
them in the early stages. I think that Maurice saw value in the Commonwealth 
but he was also suspicious. 
 
SO: Well, he was certainly suspicious that Britain would not protect Grenada 
against what they believed to be America’s plan to invade the island. 
 
RJ: Yeah. 
 
SO: I know that Sir Sonny received a letter from Prime Minister Bishop in 
March 1983 – approximately six months before ‘Operation Urgent Fury’ 
– saying, in essence, “We believe the Americans are going to invade. 
I’m very concerned about this.” The head of Political Affairs, Hugh Craft, 
passed this message to the Prime Minister’s Office. The FCO told 
Bishop that, “These ideas are fanciful.” 
 
RJ: Yeah, the Americans held some exercises off the coast of Puerto Rico with 
names similar to Grenada and the Grenadines. But I think Grenada saw its 
connections more with Guyana then, and [with] Cuba, definitely. So, on the 
Commonwealth side, it would be Guyana, Trinidad… [but] certainly not those 
OECS countries. Belize had a particular self-interest, you know. 
 
 I’ll tell you the story. When they were having the CARICOM meeting in 
Trinidad, it was meant to begin at night. I was sent over in the day to do a 
recce of the situation. One of the people I spoke to was George Price, who 
was my good friend. I went to see him. He used to call me ‘Mr Rashleigh’. He 
said, “Ah, Mr Rashleigh. I’m glad you’ve come!”  He said, “You know, I was 
coming down on the plane. Tom Adams and Edward Seaga took me off the 
plane in Barbados and told me how there might be an invasion of Grenada.” 
He was very worried and he said, “I have the British planes – the Harrier 
jump-jets – and some British troops, and I told them, ‘I don’t want to be part of 
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that. I can’t do it.’” He asked me to convey his position to PM George 
Chambers. Antigua had their Foreign Minister, Lester Bird: he wasn’t too 
happy with what was going on, nor was the Foreign Minister of Barbados, 
Louis Tull.  
 
SO: I know that Tom Adams faced quite a fight in his cabinet on this issue. 
Dame Billie Miller, who was in his Cabinet at the time, told me of the 
tensions and the debate over what was the best thing to be done. 
 
RJ: Well, you see, there was tension between Tom Adams and Maurice Bishop 
beforehand.  
 
SO: I didn’t know that. 
 
RJ: Yes. Tom Adams said something to him once – I was there – and Bishop 
made reference to the fact that Tom Adams’ father had been to a meeting in 
Paris where he praised British colonialism.  
 
SO: Oh, dear.   
 
RJ: [Laughter] 
 
SO: [Laughter] Yes, I can imagine that went down like a proverbial lead 
brick. 
 
RJ: So, I think Maurice’s solidarities, his links – ‘solidarity’ is the word you’re 
looking for – [his] solidarity, first of all, with Cuba, and on developmental work, 
not necessarily from the Commonwealth, but from countries like Middle 
Eastern countries and so on. And he was afraid, as you pointed out… 
Britain… He couldn’t…. 
 
SO: As I said, Britain passed a message back saying, “We think your 
concerns about invasion are fanciful.” This is in the spring of 1983.   
 
RJ: I see. 
 
SO: Yes. So, did both President Burnham and yourself go to the New Delhi 
Commonwealth government meeting? 
 
RJ: Yeah. Burnham never said a word on the issue. 
 
SO: Did he not? 
 
RJ: A number of things happened, I think. He left the running to Chambers as 
chairman of CARICOM. He wanted to avoid a situation in which he would 
disagree with Jamaica and St Lucia in that forum. He said not a word on the 
issue. 
 
SO: Had he conferred with Sir Sonny beforehand about keeping quiet? 
 
RJ: Maybe. I don’t know. 
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SO: I’m just thinking… So, Sir Sonny was faced with a serious diplomatic 
challenge. He had to manoeuvre through this minefield. 
 
RJ: Yes, I also remember that Geoffrey Howe asked to see me before the 
meeting, and the one thing that he raised was Grenada. I told him, “We did 
what we had to do.” And I got the impression that he was bringing a message 
from the Americans. 
 
SO: Really? That’s interesting that you recall him giving that impression. 
Whether he was or not is something else, but to convey that impression 
is an interesting thing. 
 
RJ: Yes, because at the end of it, I said to myself, “I wonder why he wanted to 
see me?” 
 
SO: Well, Howe felt particularly raw because he had made a statement in the 
British House of Commons where he led his audience to believe that 
there was going to be no such invasion. Then, when the news came 
through very shortly afterwards, it looked as if the Americans – and this 
is the height of the Cold War – had run roughshod over their key ally in 
NATO by neither forewarning nor consulting London. Grenada was a 
Commonwealth country and the Queen was head of state. So, it was 
taken as indicating Washington’s view of the insignificance of the 
‘special relationship’, as far as Britain was concerned. Tempers really 
did run very high. Howe was also considered to have deliberately misled 
the House of Commons, which is a very big deal in British politics. 
 
RJ: Yeah, yeah. Well, I’ve seen the transcript of conversations between Reagan 
and Thatcher. 
 
SO: Do you know, the fascinating thing is, Sir, that when you read those 
transcripts in the Thatcher archive, it gives the impression, “Goodness. 
That sounds very cosy.” Yet if you listen to the voice recording, it gives 
a very different impression. 
 
RJ: I see. 
 
SO: In the voice recording, Ronald Reagan is talking quite quickly, and 
begins by saying, “I think I need to throw my hat through the door 
before I come in.” And you can hear Mrs Thatcher say, in rather a sour 
tone, “Oh! I don’t know about that.” The speed and tone of Reagan’s 
voice, and the fact that he is the only one speaking for quite a while, 
underlines that he knew he had to soothe some very ruffled feathers, 
indeed. That does not come across in the transcripts. But at the end of 
their conversation, Thatcher conveys the strong impression of, “Well, 
this is the Cold War”, and she took her political friendships very 
seriously. So, Britain had to say, “Right, we move on.” 
 
RJ: Very interesting. We live and learn! 
 
SO: I tell my students, “Facts are facts, but perception is reality.” Surely it’s 
perception – and the information that you have – that shapes diplomatic 
activity? 
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RJ: Well, yes. Daniel Patrick Moynihan had a great quotation about that: 
“Everyone is entitled to his own opinion, but not his own facts.” [Laughter] 
 
SO: [Laughter] That’s a great line!   
 
 Sir, I don’t want to go on about Grenada, as you’ve written about this at 
length in your memoirs and in your chapter in the Kenneth Hall volume. 
[‘Intervention and Non-Intervention: CARICOM in Action’ in Kenneth Hall 
(ed.) Intervention, Border and Maritime Issues in CARICOM (Ian Randle 
Publishers, 2000)] But how long, in your view, did it take for the dust to 
settle in the region? 
 
RJ: In the region? 
 
SO: Yes, and also in the Commonwealth?   
 
RJ: [Long pause] It is as if time solved the problem, you know? Then, all 
differences came home. I remember, for instance, Burnham and John 
Compton were good friends at one time… But then, I had a better 
relationship, towards the end, with Compton than Burnham. He told Compton 
once, he said, “But you do not talk to me nowadays!” [Laughter] 
 
SO: Sir, in your view, how important were personal likes and dislikes in 
Guyanese political relationships and diplomacy? 
 
RJ: It’s more so in the Caribbean. We are small societies, where everyone knows 
everybody else – but don’t take that too literally. They have connections. 
Compton, for instance, used to come here and bring his family to Guyana in 
the colonial days. They would come over by coast boat. So, I’m very intrigued 
by the kind of connections that used to take place in colonial times, without 
any official prompting or anything. The guy who was a judge from Dominica, 
who led a Commonwealth election mission to Kenya, he was saying that 
before independence, as a professional, he could work in any Caribbean 
territory without the need for a work permit, whereas after independence, he 
had to get a work permit. 
 
SO: Your friend Neville Linton made reference to these existing colonial 
contacts and networks: the acculturation and socialisation of education 
and patterns of movement. Neville described these as operating within 
‘colonial silos’, so the British colonial world had different views of the 
French colonial world in the Caribbean, and the Dutch element, and the 
American element. Neville’s description was, “We absorbed the attitude 
of the coloniser towards the other colonisers. So, we didn’t like the 
French!” [Laughter] That was how he put it. Are you suggesting there 
was more of a communality of the Caribbean world, whereas Neville 
feels it was more fragmented? 
 
RJ: No, I’m not. My thinking is about the Anglo-Caribbean: that’s what I’m talking 
about. But also, if you look at Guyana and Suriname, one characteristic that 
surprises me is that if you come from America – or from any Latin American 
country – you’ll say that those two countries drive on the wrong side of the 
road! Well, that’s a legacy of when Britain was in Suriname. Now, to my mind, 
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Suriname is Dutch. But we still have that characteristic there. So, Guyana and 
Suriname had that same characteristic. Guyana and Suriname are called the 
‘continental Caribbean’. 
 
SO: Yes, you’re not Latin American countries. Sir, when President Forbes 
Burnham died in 1985 and President Desmond Hoyte took office, was 
there an appreciable shift in Guyana’s attitude, involvement or 
engagement in a Commonwealth context? 
 
RJ: No, not at all. Hoyte just carried on Burnham’s policy. The Iwokrama project 
was developed by Hoyte – that was an idea that was incubated in the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. 
 
SO: Indeed. So, was this your brainchild? 
 
RJ: Yes, when I was running the Ministry. I will say my officials and I incubated it. 
The idea came from a kind of mishmash. For me, the idea started with the G7 
meeting in Houston, when George HW Bush was President, and there they 
had taken the decision that they should work for an international convention 
on tropical forests. I said to myself, “Who the hell are these people? They’ve 
cut down their forests and now they want to come and tell me about my 
forests?” It sounded almost something like that. And then I began to think 
about it more, and then I decided to start talking to other people from Forestry 
and people from other parts of the government. From that emerged this idea 
of what could happen. In Guyana, because of the nature of our forests, you 
can’t clear fell them and we have over the years developed a system 
whereby, with certain species, you can only cut so much out of so many 
hectares. So, we were already on a sustainable basis and so that’s there 
already. So, we said, “Okay, come and see what we’re doing, but have it 
under the Commonwealth auspices.” We persuaded Hoyte to raise it at the 
Kuala Lumpur meeting. Then, when Anyaoku became the Secretary General, 
the idea was pursued. So, that’s a prime example of how the Commonwealth 
could help. 
 
Another way the Commonwealth can help is when you have development 
issues: through the Commonwealth Foundation [or] the CFTC. I remember, 
for instance, when our sugar industry was really going good, and Kenya 
wanted technicians. Some technicians went from Guyana to Kenya. Those 
are unsung benefits of the Commonwealth. 
 
SO: Without a doubt, Sir. Both the Technical Assistance Group, TAG, and 
the CFTC were designed to facilitate South-South collaboration through 
the most appropriate experts. 
 
RJ: Yeah. And also North-South. 
 
SO: Well, indeed. Well, West-South. 
 
RJ: Yes, yeah. And you had this on the non-governmental side; for example, you 
had Zena Daysh from CHEC, the Commonwealth Human Ecology Council. 
All of them were Commonwealth officers and they made a contribution 
towards UNCED. The Commonwealth Foundation links the Commonwealth 
NGOs. You have the Commonwealth Youth Programme. Don’t forget the 
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Commonwealth Development Corporation; very important. And then there are 
the other arms, like the lawyers, the attorney generals… 
 
SO: The Commonwealth Lawyers Association, the Commonwealth 
Magistrates and Judges Association, the Commonwealth Parliamentary 
Association… All of those, as you say, are Commonwealth-accredited 
civil society actors. 
 
RJ: Yes, that’s right. 
 
SO: Yes. It seems to me that the Commonwealth was something of a pilot 
fish in supporting these civil society actors. So, when international 
relations really began to open up after the end of the Cold War in the 
early 1990s, this era saw the real flowering of their activities. Yet these 
international civil society actors were already well established within the 
Commonwealth context. 
 
RJ: Now we have ‘uncivil society’, like Al Qaeda. [Laughter] 
 
SO: Yes, if you talk about ‘non-state actors’! 
 
RJ: Non-state actors, eh? [Laughter] 
 
SO: Oh, yes. Some Commonwealth governments now seem to interpret ‘civil 
society’ as shorthand for organisations or associations that promote 
human rights and LGBT rights, and can be particular suspicious of their 
activities. So, the description ‘civil society actors’ has become 
somewhat distorted in some governments’ minds. 
 
RJ: One of the guys at the Human Rights Association gave me a beautiful phrase. 
He wrote a beautiful phrase about how, “One of the functions of civil society is 
to mobilize indignation.” That’s beautiful. 
 
SO: Yes, it is. I wrote down the phrase that you yourself used: “There are 
several perceptions of the words ‘civil society’. The term is used to refer 
to non-governmental or non-profit organisations and unions [which 
demonstrate] a concern with the way that politics, economics, military, 
and social power is exercised, rather than the pursuit of power itself.”  
 
RJ: Yes. Civil society is the mediating power between the mega structures of the 
state and of the marketplace. 
 
SO: Sir, please, could I just go back to the issue of South Africa... 
 
RJ: Sure. 
 
SO: ...because this was surely an extraordinary combination of the state and 
the marketplace with the anti-apartheid struggle. Please, could you 
reflect on your view of the contribution of the Commonwealth towards 
the ending of apartheid in South Africa? 
 
RJ: Oh, I think it’s huge. It was tremendous. Let me mark some signposts. You 
have the Gleneagles Agreement of 1977. You have the Commonwealth 
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Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa, CCFMSA, and you have 
the Eminent Persons Group with Malcolm Fraser and General Obasanjo and 
all that flowed from that. To that, you have to add the actions of individual 
Commonwealth countries acting within the context – not solely, but acting 
also within the context – of those signposts and all the implementation part of 
it as contribution of the Commonwealth. On the other side of the coin, look at 
the way in which the people who were subject to apartheid have rated the 
actions of the Commonwealth: Mandela, Tambo, all of them have spoken in 
great praise of the Commonwealth. Look at Mozambique. It’s a reflection of 
the actions of the Commonwealth in terms of what was done in Southern 
Africa and involving Mozambique. Mozambique also has a high regard for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
SO: Of course, Mozambique joined the Commonwealth in 1995, after the 
country’s first all-party elections and South Africa’s formal re-
admission. 
 
RJ: Yes, [they] joined the Commonwealth. 
 
SO: Those who used to work at the Commonwealth Secretariat have 
commented to me that the contribution of the Commonwealth to the 
final transition to black majority rule seems to have been forgotten by 
the present ANC government. It appears that the ANC’s political need 
for legitimacy emphasises the domestic ‘armed struggle’ and 
downplays – or completely ignores – the contribution of the wider 
international community, of which the Commonwealth was a key part. 
So, the Commonwealth’s contribution seems to have been completely 
eclipsed. 
 
RJ: No, I don’t think we should be saying that. Look, for anything like that, the 
main task was for the people who were affected, and what others do is to help 
those people. That’s the way I see it: the Commonwealth was of assistance. 
There’s no secret in that. Right now, the ANC aren’t expressing their 
gratitude, but they have done in the past. 
 
SO: True. Perhaps then it’s a lament that an aging crop of ANC leaders and 
the current set of politicians have forgotten that assistance. I think 
that’s the essence.  
 
RJ: Yes, absolutely… 
 
SO: Yes. But as you say, you can’t be eternally grateful. 
 
 RJ: Unless there is an occasion to be reminded of it. For instance, two of 
Mugabe’s secretaries were trained in Guyana. When they trained here, we 
had a system where, when the original ones come for training, they had to do 
a period of attachment to a house in the area, and one of them was attached 
to my house. And then she eventually became a Secretary of the High 
Commissioner of London. Once, when we had a Foreign Ministers meeting in 
Harare, I went to see Mugabe. He was meeting the heads of delegation, so 
Mugabe said, “Just a minute; don’t go yet.” And he said something to an aide 
and then a girl came out. It was one of the girls who had been trained in 
Guyana! 
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SO: Oh. [Laughter] That’s very nice. 
 
RJ: Yes, so what I’m saying is that Mugabe hadn’t forgotten. 
 
SO: No. 
 
RJ: So, unless the occasion arises… 
 
SO: Sir, in connection with Robert Mugabe, once he became the leader of 
Zimbabwe after April 1980, one of the issues which is very striking is 
that the Commonwealth, having provided remarkable assistance to 
Zimbabwean independence, was then extraordinarily quiet – as was 
Britain also extraordinary quiet - on the killings in Matabeleland between 
1982-85. In his memoirs, Sir Sonny attaches enormous importance to 
the Lusaka meeting, his diplomacy behind the scenes at Lancaster 
House and the Commonwealth election observation mission and 
monitoring force, all of which he presents as a triumph of 
Commonwealth diplomacy. So, this Commonwealth silence is really 
very loud. Please, could you comment on that? 
 
RJ: I think that is regrettable. I think two things I would say is that the 
Commonwealth didn’t do enough, I believe, to pressure particularly the United 
States in terms of what were its commitments, and also, they haven’t been 
hard enough on Mugabe for what he’s turned out to be. 
 
SO: Well, the Commonwealth tried to be tough on Mugabe in 2002 – in its 
election observation mission report in 2002. PJ Patterson was head of 
the group that was trying to encourage Zimbabwe to remedy 
deficiencies in its political sphere and in human rights, and to be 
supportive while he did this. Yet the troika of Obasanjo, Mbeki and John 
Howard, along with Patterson, were unable to stop Robert Mugabe from 
pulling out of the Commonwealth. 
 
RJ: But you’re kind of dealing with one leg of the problem, you know? 
 
SO: Do you recall knowing about the killings in Matabeleland after 
independence? 
 
RJ: Oh yes, oh yes. I mean, wasn’t it on the news all of the time? 
 
SO: Yes, Sir, it was in the news. I heard about it when I was working in 
Kenya for the British Council. I also had friends in Harare who were 
saying, “This is what is happening.”  
 
RJ: It wasn’t on the news? 
 
SO: No, it was in the news as well. It was covered in the New York Times. 
But why didn’t governments make public comment? Surely this would 
be a place for the Commonwealth Secretary General to speak out?  
 
RJ: In fact, I remember one year when I was in New York – this is in the twenty-
first century – I had then a very good friend from Algeria, a journalist, who 
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used to work in the FLN, the Algerian liberation movement of Ahmed Ben 
Bella. And Ben Bella had sent him to give Sam Nujoma his first AK-47. He 
also knew Jonas Savimbi. He became a very good friend of Andy Young. And 
Andy Young had worked a lot, while he was at the UN, on the Zimbabwe 
issue. And he, myself and Andy Young met and said, “Why don’t we get in 
contact with some people to deal with the Zimbabwean situation?” But from 
both sides – that is, honouring the commitments that were made and getting 
Mugabe to stop these actions. But you are right. I felt very strongly. 
 
SO: But, Sir, what happened to this idea of some kind of collective, discreet 
pressure? 
 
RJ: We were three non-entities, you know? Andy Young was a private citizen by 
then. He had a consultant group. 
 
SO: Carter had fired Andrew Young from his position as US Ambassador to 
the UNO, hadn’t he? 
 
RJ: Yes. 
 
SO: For being a little too outspoken? 
 
RJ: [Laughter] Yes! 
 
SO: So, President Carter ‘let him go’. 
 
RJ: Yes. But you’re absolutely right. Of course, by that time, I’d become 
convinced that we ought to do something. When we were doing something at 
the UN, the Cuban Foreign Minister – who was a very good friend of mine 
and had very similar views – sent one of his colleagues to me with a 
message: “The Minister asked me to come and see you. He understands that 
you are planning to do so and so.” He says, “He asked me to tell you that 
many a commitment made at the delegates’ lounge is not honoured in the 
committee room.” 
 
SO: Indeed, yes. And this was a classic example of it. 
 
RJ: At the UN, I think there are too many pledges. 
 
SO: Yes, and not enough follow through. 
 
RJ: Anyway, I’m digressing… 
 
SO: Sir, I am conscious that I have made you talk for a long time. As a 
general question, to start to wrap up this discussion, what is your 
remembered view of the value of the Commonwealth Heads of 
Government Meetings? You made reference earlier to the ‘non-heads’ 
getting together… 
  
RJ: [Laughter] 
 
SO: ...at such things. But you couldn’t go to the retreats, could you? 
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RJ: No, we did not go to the retreats. No, we couldn’t. And on Southern Africa, not 
even real heads would go to that retreat discussion. I remember some would 
go. Ratu Mara said, “They don’t want us!”  
 
 To answer your question, I think one of its values is its informality, which 
allows for a freer exchange across the board. Not just, “Now I give the floor to 
Mr So-and-So.” 
 
SO: The classic UN style. Yes, indeed.  
 
RJ: As I was saying to you, with Lee Kuan Yew and Nyerere, when Lee Kuan 
Yew said, “Why are we discussing refugees in Africa?” Lee didn’t understand 
the problem. I mean, we could talk like that. 
 
SO: Yes. 
 
RJ: So, I think that’s a great thing. Also this idea that they would have the retreat, 
where some of them would be away from the glare of the public and then 
they’d discuss what they wouldn’t discuss at the formal conference. I think the 
friendships develop.  
 
I remember for the same Lusaka conference, when I was there, Nyerere’s 
time to speak came. He began by saying, “This issue is so important that I 
wrote it down, because a careful word is better than a colourful one.” Now, 
you can’t say that at the UN. 
 
SO: No, indeed. I know Lee Kuan Yew described these Commonwealth 
Heads of Government Meetings as “seminars for world leaders”. 
 
RJ: [Laughter] 
 
SO: High-powered, intellectual engagement, combined with a determined 
degree of spontaneity and also the private diplomacy of the retreat, 
facilitated by the Secretary General as well. 
 
RJ: Yeah. And there are all those bilateral meetings, too. And bilateral meetings 
take place outside of the UN and in other places. Well, the Commonwealth 
has a spirit of its own. There is a spirit of, like, “I know you!” 
 
SO: But did that start to break down during your engagement with the 
Commonwealth, just because it was getting bigger? In the 1970s, there 
was an expansion in membership with the independence of the Pacific 
countries and the growing number of small island member states. 
 
RJ: That’s true. When I become Guyana’s Representative at the UN, I found a 
certain kind of formality about it – a ‘formal informality’ – whereas when we 
meet in the Commonwealth it is really informal. 
 
SO: So, there was no unspoken code of behaviour [in the Commonwealth] 
that you might have at the United Nations? It’s a different engagement? 
 
RJ: Yeah. 
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SO: Please, could you comment on the Commonwealth Foreign Ministers 
meetings and the Commonwealth Senior Officials meetings, with their 
networks of support? 
 
RJ: I saw that question on your list. You see, I don’t have any recollections of any 
significance of those meetings – I really don’t. I remember I went to one which 
was special in 1970. The Commonwealth had arranged a meeting of 
Permanent Secretaries in Singapore. Or are you talking about things that take 
place when the High Commissioners are in London? 
 
SO: Well, the network of Commonwealth High Commissioners is yet another 
dimension, with their regular ‘get-togethers’ in post taking place in any 
Commonwealth country. 
 
RJ: Are you talking about meetings of senior officials before a Commonwealth 
Prime Ministers meeting? 
 
SO: Yes, I am. Sir, I am talking about all of these types of meetings, as well 
as the pattern of senior officials who accompany their leaders to 
meetings. Senior officials don’t like their heads going ‘off-piste’! They 
don’t like them going away without their briefs. Officials can have 
common cause to get to know each other.  
 
RJ: I remember Lord Carrington saying to me, “I have to leave, because I don’t 
know what the lady [Margaret Thatcher] will say.” [Laughter] I really can’t 
remember anything more about that. 
 
SO: Please, if I could ask the last question about the Commonwealth and 
leadership. It seems that, under the Guyanese Secretary General, the 
Commonwealth became particularly Secretary General-centric. By his 
own energy, drive and vision, Sonny Ramphal worked to ensure that the 
Commonwealth was ‘helping the world to negotiate’, although it could 
not negotiate for the world. 
 
RJ: That’s a good way of putting it. Well, I don’t have much recollection of the role 
of Arnold Smith, in the sense that I was involved in the conference in Ottawa 
and the one in Jamaica. Now, one thing that I remembered about the one in 
Jamaica was the international economic question. 
 
SO: Connected to the New International Economic Order? 
 
RJ: Yes. It was connected to those principles, because President Forbes 
Burnham was a great speaker and there was a very good debate. Arnold 
Smith, the outgoing Secretary General, struck me as a civil servant who’d 
taken over the job, whereas Ramphal struck me as a ‘non-political politician’. 
 
SO: Yes, that’s a very good way of putting it: a ‘non-political politician’. 
 
RJ: [Laughter] And Anyaoku was somewhere in between the two. Had he served 
before as a Foreign Minister? 
 
SO: Yes, briefly – as Nigeria’s Foreign Minister between 1983 and 1984, 
before his government was overthrown in a coup. 
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RJ: Yeah, but he was also a civil servant. 
 
SO: Yes, he was. He had been at the Secretariat since 1966. 
 
RJ: Combined, in their own respective ways, these Secretary Generals helped the 
Commonwealth [make] a mark. Sonny was the one that gave the 
Commonwealth the biggest mark on the international stage. Anyaoku kept on 
that tradition – maybe not to the same level but with different leadership. You 
have to be kind to Arnold Smith as well, because he is the one who started 
the whole thing. 
 
SO: He set up the Secretariat as an international organisation. Sonny 
inherited that bureaucracy, as well as the policy space of the SG 
position and the latitude that came with that, yes. 
 
RJ: Yeah. Sonny seriously is like a balloon: if you blow it up, it will expand! 
[Laughter] 
 
SO: It’s using the space – using the ‘soft power’ policy space! 
 
RJ: [Laughter]. 
 
SO: But as you say, he’s a man of his time. This was the Cold War; this was 
when international institutions at top level are hidebound or 
complicated by that ideological standoff. So, something like the 
Commonwealth provided a forum for a different sort of engagement and 
exchange. 
 
RJ: That’s right. 
 
SO: Sir Sonny told me, in his interview with me, that his participation in 
commissions to debate the big issues of the day was highly deliberate, 
as debate in other high-level organisations was hidebound by the 
East/West divide. 
 
RJ: People are shaped by their time and it would be very difficult to replicate 
Ramphal. The time won’t allow it. Even if Ramphal were to go back there 
again, he’d be a different person. His output would be different. 
 
SO: It would be. There are different challenges and needs in the international 
community. 
 
RJ: Yes, and different opportunities. I say, “All hail to the Commonwealth!” They 
had these three Secretaries General [who all] wanted to give an effort – 
wanted to inspire it and keep it going. 
 
SO: The one permanent attribute of the modern Commonwealth has been 
the Queen, as its head. What was your perception of the value the 
Queen brought by her particular style to the headship of the 
Commonwealth? 
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RJ: Here I have to try not to remember what Sonny said… [Laughter] I think the 
Monarch functions as an emblem of overall stability and continuity, and of 
unity in diversity. I see her value and her contribution in highly symbolic and 
functional terms. What she does, too, [is that] she provides the opportunity for 
a renewal of respect for order and dignity and decency. Not everybody 
benefits from that, but that’s my view. 
 
SO: But that doesn’t imply a determination to reinforce the status quo. The 
Commonwealth has changed dramatically since 1949 when it was 
formerly founded, and since 1952 when she became head. 
 
RJ: Yes, but not because of the monarch but because of certain circumstances 
outside the role. And also, in that welter of changes… [Pause] She has a 
presence, you know? I think it was in Lusaka that I met her, and I remember 
being impressed by... In some sense, the kind of head that you like. 
 
SO: “The kind of head that you like”? Please could you put your finger on 
quite why? 
 
RJ: Well, think of a headless institution… [Laughter] Like a chicken with its head 
cut off, running all over the place…[Laughter] You have a feeling…I don’t 
know how to put it, really. 
 
SO: A feeling that you’re being taken seriously? 
 
RJ: Yes. 
 
SO: With courtesy and attention? 
 
RJ: Yes, yes. 
 
SO: I’m putting words in your mouth here, which I shouldn’t be! 
 
RJ: No, it’s alright; they’re good words! 
 
SO: I think they’re okay. [Laughter] 
 
RJ: [Laughter] As I say, she’s a good representative. If I had a monarch, she 
would be a good monarch. But then, forget her, forget the monarchy, and say 
she’s the head of this association and the association needs a head of that 
kind. She’s a worthy head of association. 
 
SO: She’s a world leader and she has media value. 
 
RJ: Well, there she’s also known as a normal person. 
 
SO: She also has a great spirit of fun, a good sense of humour.   
 
RJ: She’s not Margaret. [Laughter] 
 
SO: What was your perception of Mrs Thatcher’s contribution or attitude to 
the Commonwealth? I’m talking about your perception. I read her 
papers and I can think, “My goodness: what industry, what engagement! 
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She clearly valued it!” But I’m just wondering how it came across at the 
time? 
 
RJ: I should tell you, I first met Mrs Thatcher before she was Prime Minister, when 
she was Leader of the Opposition. Ivor Richard had brought her across – Ivor 
Richard was the UK Ambassador in New York. She came across to New York 
and he organised a dinner and invited a number of us. There were twelve of 
us – ambassadors – whom I think, in his view, represented a kind of cross 
section of views that Mrs Thatcher should be exposed to, Ivor being of the 
Labour party. And when we had the dinner and she left, I got the impression 
he was not satisfied with the questions we’d asked. It hadn’t fitted his 
framework. But I found her a person of strong views – almost unshakable, 
you know? 
 
SO: She certainly had a rather didactic style, although she could be 
persuaded.  
 
RJ: Well, I’m telling you my impression of that time. She was a ‘tough cookie’. 
[Laughter] When I saw her at the Commonwealth meetings, the word that 
came to my mind was often ‘intransigent’. She wouldn’t budge without a 
bloody fight. 
 
 I think there were some principles on which one could support her. I 
remember [that], at the time of the Falklands War, I persuaded President 
Burnham to call her and give her support on the grounds that Guyana could 
not support the settlement of the Falklands issue, except if it was done 
peacefully because of Venezuela. We had a self-interest here. 
 
SO: You could not support anything that undermined sovereignty and non-
intervention as a cardinal tenet of international law? 
 
RJ: That’s right; that’s right. And he says to me, “Why are you always coming up 
with these ideas?” Anyway, he phoned her. Afterwards, he was telling us, she 
said, “Oh, Forbes, that’s so nice of you.” [Laughter] So, I think there was a 
part of her that was reachable. You only had to know how to do it. It’s only 
what she wants. [Laughter] 
 
SO: One of the other powerful ladies in the Commonwealth whom you would 
have known was, of course, Indira Gandhi. 
 
RJ: Oh, yes, Indira – Mrs Gandhi. 
 
SO: Please, could you comment on your perception of Mrs Gandhi’s view of 
the Commonwealth or of the value she attached to it? 
 
RJ: No, I can’t say anything from direct knowledge – only what I’ve heard. 
Certainly, Mrs Gandhi and I shared something in common. 
 
SO: What was this? 
 
RJ: When Sonny Ramphal indicated his intention to run as Secretary General, I’d 
written to Sonny saying to him that I thought he would make a more valuable 
contribution to international affairs if he remained Foreign Minister of Guyana. 
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I understand Mrs Gandhi had said, about the same time, “You will be more 
valuable to the Non Aligned Movement.” I think Sonny did make a speech in 
which he made reference to both of those things. 
 
SO: In his memoirs, he makes reference to Mrs Gandhi saying, “If you are 
going to take it, you have to shake it up.” She wondered why he was 
taking a job in this ‘backwater’ association. 
 
RJ: I see, yes. As I said, I can’t give any direct knowledge of Mrs Gandhi’s views. 
She attended the conferences, she made contributions, and they were 
valuable contributions. I remember, for instance, in Melbourne, when she had 
organised a meeting on the side for the Commonwealth countries that were 
going to the Cancun meeting. Someone was speaking – I can’t remember 
who – and then she said to Burnham: “Forbes, you haven’t said anything yet.” 
And then he spoke and she said, “Oh, but that all sounds so beautiful!” I can’t 
remember all he said. 
 
 So, I have a very good impression of Mrs Gandhi. I remember when we were 
in Zimbabwe for Zimbabwe’s independence. She asked to meet Burnham – I 
have this in my book – with the specific indication that she was only going to 
have her foreign minister [with her], suggesting that she wanted to have a 
‘heart to heart’ talk. What I found remarkable was the way they both let their 
hair down and spoke of their problems of government. 
 
SO: Yes, indeed. Because the domestic situation for Mrs Gandhi at the 
beginning of the 1980s was becoming much more tense, following the 
period of Emergency rule she had instigated in the late 1970s [1975-77]. 
 
RJ: That’s right, yes. 
 
SO: I know some have argued that it was problematic for Sir Sonny, as 
Secretary General, that the largest democracy in the Commonwealth 
had brought in a state of emergency; all was not smooth in the 
Commonwealth house. 
 
RJ: Well, contradictions are never absent from life. 
 
SO: Well, indeed, and if you have a larger association, you’re going to have 
more contradictions. Sir, please, could I ask, having stepped down as 
Foreign Minister of Guyana in 1990 – this is now 25 years ago –… 
 
RJ: A long time. 
 
SO: …what is your view of the value and the future of the Commonwealth 
now? You’ve written extensively on international diplomacy and the 
requirements of an effective diplomatic actor. 
 
RJ: Well, there are several things happening. I think you have to look at what is 
happening within member countries of the Commonwealth and ask yourself 
whether you are getting new generations of leaders and what their values are. 
What are their objectives? What are their prime objectives? What are their 
world views, and do those world views have a role for the Commonwealth? 
Do they see the circumstances involving a role for the Commonwealth? 
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 Speaking from the perspective of the Caribbean, I think now we have a 
generation of leaders in the Caribbean who don’t have either the regional 
view or the world view of the generation of Eric Williams, Michael Manley, 
Burnham and Errol Barrow. Therefore, what will be possible for CARICOM is 
not predictable now. 
 
 Now, if the succeeding generation can be imbued with a sense of regionalism 
that is different from the older generation, then I think I can say something will 
carry on. It is the same with the Commonwealth. You talk about the biggest 
democracy, India. What is Modi’s world view? I don’t know the answer to the 
questions; I’m just asking. Having regard to the philosophy of his party and 
the nature of Indian society, how it’s evolving… I don’t know. So, I will answer 
your question with a question mark! Who would have imagined that you’d 
have had a Barack Obama? I think the present crop of Americans don’t 
appreciate Barack Obama and don’t understand what he’s done. 
 
SO: No. I’m totally in agreement with you. 
 
RJ: I was saying on Sunday that if you think of what Barack Obama has done – 
say, on climate change, on sexual orientation, or what he is trying to do with 
fairness in terms of trade – he is very progressive. And even his approach to 
fundamentalism, his approach to the use of military power... I think I am 
kinder to Barack Obama than a lot of Americans! 
 
SO: Sir, I agree with you. 
 
RJ: You see, I have another line. The great powers are never constrained by the 
contradictions of their history.  
 
SO: Yes, but smaller powers are. 
 
RJ: They have to [be]. They’re made to!  
 
SO: The smaller powers are constrained by the contradictions of their 
history. Well, they carry their history much more immediately with them. 
 
RJ: Yes. I was talking about John McCain and his colleagues and the way they 
trumpet American ‘exceptionalism’. What do they mean by it? In a world 
where you’re talking about globalisation, do they really understand how 
people feel for what they have done to them before? 
 
SO: ‘No’, is the answer. 
 
RJ: The answer is no! In terms of the Commonwealth, I would say that 
decolonisation  applies not only to the colonised, but also to the coloniser. The 
coloniser has concepts of ruler-ship. 
 
SO: So, just to connect that back to the Commonwealth, which started off as 
the ‘British’ Commonwealth, how far do you feel that Britain has gone 
through that decolonisation of the mind? 
 
RJ: Well, they dropped the ‘British’ from the Commonwealth!   
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SO: Indeed, they did. But you can still have that hangover. 
 
RJ: The vestiges are still there but some have gone. The fact of life in the 
international community now means that… You know, when you deal with the 
Arab world… Immediately after the OPEC price hike, when they wanted to get 
their money, they began to invest in Harrods and buy rare art works. Attitudes 
begin to change. But those old cronies in the United States, they don’t see 
that change taking place. They tell Barack Obama, “We still have the 
strongest military in the world,” which is true, but it can’t be used as before. 
 
SO: Exactly. Fernand Braudel remarked that America was extraordinary in 
that it achieved its independence before it had undergone its own 
internal decolonisation. And now, as you say, in terms of the rest of the 
world, it still has to unpack that ‘decolonisation of the mind’. 
 
RJ: Yes, that’s a good truth. I mean, you get a Sarah Palin… It’s difficult in most 
other countries to get a Palin to be nominated! 
 
SO: Thank goodness! [Laughter] 
 
RJ: Yes, I mean, that’s why it’s all so crazy. I was watching Fox News last night, 
and they were saying that it is time she gets a handle on her ideology. 
[Laughter] McCain picked her!  
 
SO: You just have to shake your head in sheer disbelief. 
 
RJ: But he doesn’t take any responsibility for it. 
 
SO: The Commonwealth as a ‘non-ideological organisation’, then? 
[Laughter] Sir, I think I should stop there, but thank you very much 
indeed. 
 
 [END OF AUDIOFILE] 
 
